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INTEGRATION OF THE INTERAGENCY IN
THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS

By

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"Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors."¹ National Security Strategy 1999

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the President of the United States to develop and publish an annual National Security Strategy (NSS). This strategy covers vital global interests, threats, objectives, and the use of all elements of national power to achieve those objectives. The early cold war versions of the NSS focused on the policy of containment, but with the end of the cold war, the strategy changed. The Bush Administration introduced "Collective Engagement", which led to the Clinton Administration's "Engagement and Enlargement" strategy. The 1997 and 1998 versions of the NSS emphasized the "Imperative of Engagement"², and the 1999 NSS reached the logical conclusion of this evolution by announcing "The Strategy of Engagement".³ Engagement has evolved to become the foundation of US foreign policy.

In 1997 the NSS introduced what has become the three components of the strategy of engagement; Shaping the international security environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future.⁴ The current National Military Strategy (NMS) took its cue from the NSS and

is titled "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era."⁵ Responding to the full spectrum of crises (Fighting and winning), and preparing for the future (Doctrine, organization, technology), were long established activities. The addition of shaping as one of the three pillars of the NMS created the need for a formal program.

To this end, the 1997 NMS introduced "Peacetime Military Engagement" as the primary means to conduct shaping. Peacetime military engagement is defined as "all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime."⁶ Shortly after, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) established a new type of deliberate plan, the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Each regional CINC, and the executive agents for unassigned areas (Russia, Canada, Mexico), was tasked to develop a TEP. The TEP consists of a strategic concept published biennially, and seven years of activities annexes which detail engagement activities.

It is outside the scope of this paper to detail the TEP process or product, however some background is useful. TEP has its origins in the preparation for the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A comprehensive review of overseas presence requirements was conducted, a central objective was to check that resources committed to presence were consistent with national priorities in each region. In addition the Joint Staff

worked to develop an historical "baseline engagement force" for use in the development of strategy, force structure, and budgets.⁷ This effort proved very difficult. Although everyone agreed that much engagement was being done, with no formal program, each CINC had his own definition and tracking process. TEP was the process designed to execute the shaping portion of the NMS. TEP also provided the strategy / activity audit trail, and provided coherent input to the programming and budgeting process. TEP was developed to accomplish four main objectives: Capture all engagement activities in one place and one format; Link strategic objectives to CINC activities; Assess the cost and value of the activities; and Link strategy to resources.

Guidance for the development of theater engagement plans is published in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) in the form of desired regional end states and tiered (prioritized) regional objectives. The CINC TEP is submitted to the CJCS for an integrated national level review, and integration into the global family of engagement plans. When approved by the Chairman, the family of plans is used by the Services, supporting commanders, Defense agencies, and other USG agencies to develop programs and budgets. The approved family of plans is forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) for review to ensure that they conform with established priorities of the USG; support national objectives,

plans, and programs; and where *interagency support is required, receive the priority and attention necessary to be sufficiently funded within the programs of non-DoD agencies.*⁸ (Italics added)

Theater engagement plans and the associated theater engagement planning process are DoD programs. As originally envisioned, engagement planning would have involved the interagency process at both the strategic and operational level. Drafters of the TEP concept envisioned DoD convening an NSC interagency working group to coordinate with the Department of State on TEP regional objectives.⁹ As the TEP concept was briefed and approved, compromises were made to gain concurrence from key players, and formal interagency coordination fell out. There are vestiges of interagency coordination found in the TEP guidance. The CINCs are instructed to estimate the resources required to conduct their engagement activities, to include resources they need from civilian agencies.¹⁰ During strategic concept development the staff is advised of the critical role of the US Embassy country teams, and to give "their approaches to specific challenges within their country appropriate attention in the development of engagement plans."¹¹ More to the point, in the strategic concept, CINCs are required to identify US political, economic, and military interests and factors in the theater, with specific guidance on addressing trends, activities, challenges and the impact on regional stability.¹² Currently

however, each CINC determines the extent of interagency involvement in his TEP. There is no formal established interagency role in TEP.

Just as the national strategy and joint doctrine emphasize the imperative of jointness, they recognize the different means of national power and the requirement for them to work together. The current NSS states that to successfully implement the strategy of engagement "requires an integrated approach that brings to bear all the capabilities..."¹³ and goes on to discuss the coordination of diplomatic, economic, and military means of power. The NSS argues that the military plays a crucial role in shaping the international security environment but "is not a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific, and cultural activities."¹⁴

The NSS is designed for an interagency approach in its execution, specifically in the shaping component. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States is clear in its understanding of the means of national power, and the requirement for an integrated interagency approach. "When the United States undertakes military operations, the armed forces of the United States are only one component of a national level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a

cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies.¹⁵

"... commend you for integrating other instruments of national power into the DoD deliberate planning process. Considering political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other non-military activities in defense planning is an important initiative that will strengthen our ability to quickly and effectively respond to crises. Please forward to the NSC those political-military concepts for contingency and war plans you deem necessary for interagency review and appropriate action. President Clinton, 3 November 1999¹⁶

There are two types of deliberate plans: warplans (OPLANS, CONPLANS, FUNCPLANS) and theater engagement plans. The geographic CINCs are tasked to develop both types of plans for their region in the JSCP. Both plans support the NSS, and the NMS (Responding and Shaping). The "Respond" portion of the NMS has seen a deliberate and successful effort to integrate the interagency into the planning and execution of military operations. The same circumstances that highlighted the need for interagency integration into warplans, when placed in the context of a strategy of engagement, highlight the need for interagency integration into TEP.

The post cold war world saw a rise in conflict and crisis, fueled by nationalism, ethnic and religious animosity, territorial disputes, and a breakdown in the established order. During this same period the NSS of the United States shifted from its cold war strategy of containment to the strategy of engagement. Within the strategy of engagement the US responded to this increase in tensions, and a series of natural and man made disasters, with a series of operations and interventions. US operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and others were dubbed "Complex Contingencies". They are complex because they combine diplomatic, military, political, humanitarian, social, and economic dimensions.¹⁷ The early operations were characterized by a lack of interagency planning, unclear lines of responsibility, and poor communication. Most of the civilian agencies were not organized to respond rapidly to a crisis, and had no planning expertise. Operation Restore Democracy (1994) in Haiti was the genesis of formal interagency planning. Observing the lack of coordination in the planning phase, the NSC Principals Committee directed the interagency to prepare a Political-Military implementation plan.¹⁸

These experiences led to the publication of Joint Pub 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations) in 1996, and to Presidential Decision Directive 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations) in 1997. The Handbook for Interagency

Management of Complex Contingency Operations was published in 1998, and the effort to integrate all means of national power into deliberate plans culminated in December 1999 with the addition of "Annex V" (Interagency Coordination), to the planning formats in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).¹⁹ Annex V is required for all CJCS approved deliberate plans, and is meant to provide a single source reference for the CINC to request interagency activities and to lay the groundwork for coordinating with international civilian organizations and NGO's.²⁰ The Annex must explain the integration envisioned between the military, USG agencies, and other international civilian organizations, and state in clear terms why the Deputies Committee of the NSC should authorize official interagency planning.²¹ Once authorized, Annex V becomes the basis for further planning, and the NSC staff assigns planning tasks to the appropriate USG agencies. The NSC has formed the "Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group" to coordinate this effort.²²

*"To be successful we, whose responsibility is security, need to harmonize the diplomatic, political, and economic instruments of national power."*²³ USCINCPAC Theater Strategic Intent

The desired regional end states and prioritized objectives assigned to the CINCs in the JSCP "Theater Engagement" guidance are much broader than can be achieved by military activities alone. The desired regional end state for Sub-Saharan Africa is an instructive example. "A region at peace where the spread of democracy, respect for human rights, and economic growth have produced a level of stability that allows African states to peacefully resolve conflicts and reduce the potential for human suffering and hunger."²⁴ One of the objectives given for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia is to "Encourage democratic reforms and a better understanding of civil-military relations in democratic societies and the rule of law."²⁵

The CINCs understand the importance of the interagency to achieving their engagement objectives, it is reflected in their published strategies. The US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Theater Strategy has a stated goal of "Develop integrated regional engagement approaches through cooperation with counterparts in the interagency, other unified commands, and key non-governmental and private volunteer organizations."²⁶

The reality, what the CINCs are doing in their engagement programs, has recognized the importance of and in many cases incorporated interagency participation. An excellent example of a successful CINC engagement activity that integrates interagency players is the State Partnership Program (SPP). The

National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program, begun in 1992, links U.S. states to partner nations around the globe. There are currently over thirty states with formal links to countries under the SPP. Examples include California and Ukraine, Illinois and Poland, and New Hampshire and Belize. The SPP "seeks to establish broad reaching ties between the partner state and country at all levels of society. The SPP is integrated into the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and the Ambassador's country plan.²⁷ Stated objectives of the SPP include shaping, promoting free market economies, and conducting activities beyond purely military to military.

Arizona and Kazakhstan have had a formal relationship under the SPP since 1995. The Kazak Office of Emergency Management was initially interested in the program. The Arizona Adjutant General has the Arizona office of emergency management as one of his responsibilities, and the partnership started between these two civilian agencies, under the auspices of the National Guard SPP.

The blurring of civil-military and interagency lines is demonstrated by one facet of the Arizona-Kazakhstan SPP. In 1997 a Protocol of Intentions was signed by the Governor of AZ, the State Emergency Management Committee of Kazakhstan, and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Following intensive staff coordination, exchanges, and an interagency review, the

International Workshop for Earthquake Response (IWER) was held in Almaty Kazakhstan in May 1999. This computer based planning and response workshop demonstrated regional and extra-regional response to a significant earthquake.²⁸ The participants and observers read like a blueprint for an interagency humanitarian response that a regional CINC would be involved in.

Regional participants included civil and military organizations from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. United States participants included CENTCOM, FEMA, and civil-military elements from Arizona, Louisiana, Montana, and Nevada. Observers were present from Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, and Sweden. Finally, International organizations and non-governmental organizations were present (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent, Doctors without Borders etc.)

Within the framework of the USCENTCOM Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and using the National Guard SPP as a vehicle, a state governor, the government of a sovereign republic, and a US federal agency signed a protocol. This resulted in the IWER, which included 11 nations, numerous U.S. states and USG agencies, and major international agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

As the Arizona-Kazakhstan example demonstrates, the reality of interagency participation in theater engagement has grown beyond the current doctrine and formal program. The interagency

is essential to, and has been integrated into, the CINC's engagement efforts. It is time to acknowledge this reality and formalize interagency participation in the Theater Engagement Program. There is a broad consensus among participants in engagement activities that interagency integration is desirable. As an example the Department of State has conducted coordination with the CINCs and the Joint Staff in reference to melding the Ambassador's mission performance plans and the CINC's theater engagement plans.²⁹ TEP is currently a DoD program, but TEP was always viewed as an evolutionary program that would change as it was implemented.³⁰ As a result of tough lessons learned in complex contingency operations, formal interagency integration into deliberate planning has been mandated in the form of ANNEX V to war plans. The guidance and process developed for ANNEX V should be applied to both types of deliberate plans; war plans and engagement plans.

Interagency integration is a win for all involved. The CINC gets a more comprehensive engagement plan which utilizes expertise and capabilities of the interagency. Regions and countries involved are the beneficiaries of a coordinated U.S. approach. As importantly, the interagency organizations can utilize the existing CINC staff and engagement program, a far more robust organization than their own. As an example, except in the largest countries, it is rare for the economic section of

an embassy to be larger than three or four officers. The political and economic sections combined, are often budgeted no more than a few hundred dollars a quarter for engagement activities.³¹

I recommend the definition of Peacetime Military Engagement be changed to "all activities involving other nations, intended to shape the security environment in peacetime". This change broadens the scope of engagement beyond the purely military and sets the stage for interagency involvement. Designate the DoD as the executive agent for Theater Engagement Planning, with the CINCs responsible for engagement in their areas of responsibility (AOR). The regional CINCs are staffed and organized for the task, and in fact are already leading an interagency effort. I further recommend the implementation of formal interagency participation in the formulation of national level engagement guidance, development and review of CINC TEPs, and engagement execution. No government agency would relinquish primacy in their area, but would coordinate with DoD in the theater engagement effort. Retool the Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group established by the NSC to coordinate Pol-Mil plans in Annex V. Re-name the group the "Interagency Planning Working Group" and charge it with overseeing the interagency effort in all deliberate planning (Warplans and Engagement plans).

The past fifteen years has seen much attention paid to Joint operations and Jointness, it has been ingrained and institutionalized in the DoD. The next step is "Interagency", integrating all means of national power. This has been accomplished in deliberate war plans, it is time to make it happen in Theater Engagement Plans.

¹ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: The White House, December 1999), Pg 3.

² William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: The White House, May 1997, and October 1998), Pg2, Pg 1.

³ Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1999) Pg 3.

⁴ Ibid., Pg 5.

⁵ John M Shalikashvili, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington: GPO, 1997).

⁶ Ibid., Pg 7.

⁷ Author's memory of briefings given during the development of TEP, 1997.

⁸ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Engagement Planning, CJCS Manual 3113.01A (Washington: GPO, 31 May 2000), Pg A-3.

⁹ Author participated in development of TEP concept and process 1997-1999.

¹⁰ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Engagement Planning, Pg A-3.

¹¹ Ibid. , Pg A-10.

¹² Ibid. , Pg C-3.

¹³ Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1999. Pg 4.

¹⁴ Ibid. , Pg 11.

¹⁵ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington:GPO, 1995) Pg III-11.

¹⁶ “Notes To Holders” of the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) from President Clinton as Annex V, (Interagency Coordination) to deliberate plans was approved. From briefing given by CDR Wayne Radloff, The Joint Staff J-7, Deliberate Planning Conference Washington DC, 15 March 2000.

¹⁷ Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor, Complex Contingency Operations Handbook, (Washington, August 1998), Pg 2.

¹⁸ Ibid., Pg 2.

¹⁹ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, CJCS Manual 3122.03A, (Washington: GPO, 31 December 1999).

²⁰ Ibid., Pg C-645.

²¹ Ibid., Pg C-647.

²² Phone Conversation with CDR Wayne Radloff, The Joint Staff J-7, Annex V Action Officer, 19 April 2000.

²³ United States Pacific Command's Strategy, USPACOM Homepage, 4/13/2000.

²⁴ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998, CJCS Manual 3110.01A (Washington: GPO, 1 Dec 1998), Pg E-B-9.

²⁵ Ibid. , Pg E-B-6.

²⁶ United States Central Command's Theater strategy, USCENTCOM Home Page, 4/13/2000

²⁷ Brief to World Wide Planners Conference, Wash DC by LTC Mark Kalber, Deputy Director, NGB Directorate of International Affairs, 18 Nov 1998.

²⁸ Arizona National Guard AAR Brief: International Workshop for Earthquake Response. Briefed to author by LTC Grayson, AZ NG Readiness/State Partnership Program Officer, Phoenix AZ, June 1999.

²⁹ Series of Phone conversations between author and State Department military liaison officers, 1998-1999.

³⁰ Director of the Joint Staff guidance during TEP development, 1998.

³¹ Edward Goff, State Department Economics Officer, Theater Engagement Planning: The Role for Economics, (Naval War College Unpublished paper, May 2000) Pg 10.

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